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1. Introduction 
A simple definition of liquidity is how easily a transaction can be executed. In a perfectly 
liquid market a trader can trade his desired quantity, immediately, without moving the market 
price. If liquidity is less than perfect, the trader must sacrifice on one or more of these three 
dimensions, perhaps trading a different amount, over time, and/or at a less-favorable price.     
In this empirical work I examine whether traders’ willingness to sacrifice on the quantity 
dimension varies over time. This is an important step in determining whether all three 
dimensions need to be considered in measuring an asset’s liquidity. Much theoretical work on 
liquidity assumes that traders never choose to trade a quantity other than their exogenous 
demand. For example, Black (1971) describes liquidity as the ability to trade at a good price over 
time or a worse price immediately, but assumes that traders always trade exactly their desired 
quantities in total. Models including Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985), and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987) maintain the assumption that uninformed traders must trade their exogenous 
quantity demands.   
If traders always trade their desired quantities, time-price trade-offs may be sufficient to 
explain differences in liquidity over time and across assets. But when all traders are allowed to 
rationally choose on which dimensions to sacrifice, time-price trade-offs may not be sufficient to 
summarize the liquidity of an asset. For example, in a model with all traders allowed to rationally 
choose on which dimensions to sacrifice, Hodrick and Moulton (2003) show that quantity, time, 
and price are not always substitutes.1 Time-price trade-offs can look significantly different when 
traders are willing to sacrifice along the quantity dimension versus when they are not.     
I propose that the ends of fiscal quarters are natural times when investors may have a 
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stronger desire to satisfy their quantity demands. This could be due to quarter-end window 
dressing or simply a heightened desire to have portfolios fully aligned with their stated objectives 
at times when internal and external scrutiny may be greater. I test whether investors care more 
about trading exactly their desired quantities by examining how their quantity choices change at 
quarter-end. If investors with heterogeneous exogenous demands all experience an increase in 
their desire to satisfy their demands at quarter-end, the market should witness more distinct 
quantities traded, or less trade-size clustering. More formally, I use the following empirical 
implication from Hodrick and Moulton (2003): in a market with many heterogeneous 
uninformed investors, an asset will trade at more distinct quantities when the quantity dimension 
is more binding. “At more distinct quantities” refers to trades of more different quantities taking 
place, not necessarily more trades or more total volume.2 In this model the quantity dimension is 
“more binding” when investors care more about trading exactly their quantity demands, so they 
are less willing to sacrifice on quantity to get a better price or to trade more quickly.      
Using a new data set of foreign-exchange customer transactions, I find that the number of 
distinct quantities traded increases significantly at quarter-ends, and not merely at fiscal year-
ends. This evidence suggests that the quantity dimension is indeed more binding at some times, 
as customers exhibit an  increased desire to trade precisely  their  quantity demands. An increase 
in order-splitting or exogenous demands appears less likely to explain the decrease in trade-size 
clustering at quarter-end for several reasons. Neither the number of trades nor the total volume 
increases significantly at quarter-end, and there is no significant change in the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Models in which uninformed investors are allowed more limited discretion over their trading choices include 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (1992).   
2 For example, consider a day with five trades and total volume of 100 units. If there are five trades of 20 units each, 
the asset has traded at only one quantity, but if there are two trades of 35 units and three trades of 10 units, the asset 
has traded at two quantities.     
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quantities traded. The increase in the number of quantities traded arises from investors’ trading 
more odd lots and fewer round lots, resulting in less trade-size clustering, at quarter-end. Trading 
activity in currency futures, a possible substitute asset, is also consistent with customers’ caring 
more about satisfying their exogenous demands, rather than their experiencing a change in those 
demands, at quarter-end.  
I also find that when traders care more about trading precise quantities the price impact of 
trades is  greater, suggesting that they sacrifice more on the price dimension. The extent to which 
traders care about satisfying their quantity demands may explain some of the cross-sectional and 
time-series variations in common liquidity measures. For example, Breen, Hodrick, and 
Koraczyk (2002) find that price impact varies considerably cross-sectionally, and Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2000) document time variation in several common liquidity measures.  
This work offers some of the first direct analysis of trade-size clustering. Many 
researchers have documented price clustering beyond the minimum tick size in equity markets; 
see, for example, Christie and Schultz (1994), Grossman et al. (1997), and Kandel, Sarig, and 
Wohl (2001). In the foreign-exchange market, Bessembinder (1994) documents price clustering 
in quotes and Osler (2003) finds price clustering in price-contingent orders. In a recent paper, 
Alexander and Peterson (2004) document trade-size clustering in equities. My analysis uncovers 
clustering in foreign-exchange trade sizes and finds that trades generally cluster at round sizes, 
just as the price-clustering literature finds that prices cluster at round numbers. This trade-size 
clustering is reduced at the end of calendar quarters, when investors appear to care more about 
trading precise amounts.   
This work is also complementary to the empirical literature linking trading activity to the 
choices of informed traders. Chan and Fong (2000), Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), Jones, 
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Kaul, and Lipson (1994), and McInish and Wood (1991) show that the number of transactions is 
related to asset returns and volatility in ways suggestive of informed traders’ activity in a market. 
Other researchers focus on the role of trade size in market liquidity. For example, Barclay and 
Warner (1993) find that medium-size trades tend to have the greatest price impact, suggesting 
that informed traders concentrate their trading in intermediate sizes. Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) and Glosten and Harris (1988) find that average trade size is related to Kyle’s (1985) 
market depth parameter, again measuring the impact of informed traders. My analysis 
complements these studies by examining a feature of trading activity, the number of distinct 
quantities traded, that likely reflects uninformed traders’ choices. Together these analyses 
provide a richer understanding of observed patterns of trade.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical liquidity 
model of Hodrick and Moulton (2003). Section 3 develops the econometric model. Section 4 
discusses the data. Section 5 presents the results and several robustness checks. Section 6 
examines how a more-binding quantity dimension affects the price dimension. Section 7 
concludes and outlines future work. The Appendix presents additional robustness checks.     
2. Theory 
 This section summarizes the intuition, setup, and selected results of the one-period 
version of the liquidity model developed by Hodrick and Moulton (2003), henceforth HM, under 
the assumption of uninformed investors with heterogeneous quantity demands.   
 An asset is considered perfectly liquid if one can trade the quantity one desires, 
immediately, at a price not worse than the uninformed expected value. Deviations from perfect 
liquidity in any of these three dimensions, quantity, time, and price, impose shadow costs on the 
trader. The key innovation of HM is that uninformed investors do not have to obtain exactly their 
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desired quantities. This is in contrast to most of the previous literature, which follows Black’s 
(1971) description of liquidity as the trade-off between price and immediacy, assuming that a 
trader always gets his desired quantity. By taking the shadow cost on quantity seriously, HM 
show that the mere existence of multiple quantities does not ensure that all quantities are traded 
in equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium number of quantities traded in a market with 
heterogeneous uninformed investors is increasing in the uninformed investors’ desire to satisfy 
their quantity demands. This is the empirical prediction used in this paper.   
2.1. Model summary 
In the HM one-period model there are three types of risk-neutral agents. One is a liquidity 
provider who sets a price and quantity schedule for an asset. Depending on the asset, this 
liquidity provider may be a specialist, a market maker, a dealer, or anyone who quotes a price for 
a particular quantity and stands ready to trade at that price. There are also two types of potential 
liquidity demanders, an informed trader and multiple uninformed investors. The informed and 
uninformed liquidity demanders are called “trader” and “investors”, respectively, purely for 
expositional simplicity; no assumption is made about their investment horizons. The informed 
trader represents fraction a of the liquidity demanders, 0£ a£ 1, and the uninformed investors 
represent fraction (1-a). The informed trader and the uninformed investors all rationally choose 
whether and what quantity to trade, but if they choose to trade they must trade at the price set by 
the liquidity provider for that quantity.  
HM consider a market in which prices may be quoted for a large and a small quantity on 
each side of the market. On the ask side the liquidity provider sells and the liquidity demander 
buys, and on the bid side the liquidity provider buys and the liquidity demander sells. The large 
and small quantities are denoted QAL and QAS on the ask side and QBL and QBS on the bid side, 
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with QAL > QAS > 0 > QBS > QBL, consistent with the prior literature. The prices corresponding to 
these quantities are denoted PAL, PAS, PBS and PBL. The true value of the asset is denoted P* and 
is known by the informed trader before trading begins. For expositional simplicity, a binary 
distribution for the asset’s true value is assumed here, with d the probability that P* = PL (low 
value) and (1-d) the probability that P* = PH (high value). 
Each uninformed investor is motivated to trade by an exogenous demand for quantity, 
Q*, which the uninformed investor knows before trading begins. Note that Q* can equal zero in 
this model; in other words, an uninformed investor may have no exogenous demand to trade. 
Even when her Q* is non-zero, an uninformed investor optimally chooses whether to trade her 
Q* or another quantity, including zero, as detailed below.   
All three types of agents in the HM model are rational maximizers. The liquidity provider 
is uninformed and cannot distinguish between the informed trader and the uninformed investors. 
The liquidity provider is modeled as a single agent, but (unmodeled) competition or the threat of 
competition is assumed to drive his expected profit to zero on each trade. Zero inventory and 
order-processing costs are also assumed for simplicity. The liquidity provider solves the 
following maximization:3 
max      (1-a)[ pASQAS(PAS-E) + pALQAL(PAL-E) + pBSQBS(PBS-E) +pBLQBL(PBL-E)] 
PAS, P AL, PBS, PBL 
         - a [ (1-d){fAS/PHQAS(PH-PAS) +fAL/PHQAL(PH-PAL)}  
    + d{fBS/PLQBS(PL-PBS) +fBL/PLQBL(PL-PBL)} ]          (1) 
s.t. zero expected profit per trade 
where  E is the uninformed expected value of the asset  
 p ij  is the probability the uninformed chooses to trade Qij 
                                                 
3 The liquidity provider’s maximization is very reminiscent of the earlier literature, such as Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987).   
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fij/x is the probability the informed chooses to trade Qij given P*=x. 
The first line of this maximization reflects the profits that the liquidity provider expects to 
make by trading with uninformed investors. To realize these profits the liquidity provider sets 
ask prices above and bid prices below the uninformed expected value. The second and third lines 
of the maximization capture the liquidity provider’s expected losses from trading with the 
informed trader, since in equilibrium the informed trader trades only when ask prices are below 
or bid prices are above the asset’s true value. 
The informed trader maximizes the gain from trading on his information: 4 
max     Qij(P*- Pij)                (2) 
Qij 
 Î{0, QAS, QAL, QBS, QBL} 
The informed trader has a preference, all else equal, for larger quantities and for 
quantities that have prices closer to the uninformed expected value.   
HM’s main innovation appears in the uninformed investors’ maximization: 
max     Qij(E – Pij) - q(|Q*-Qij|)              (3) 
Qij 
 Î{0, QAS, QAL, QBS, QBL} 
 where  E = the uninformed expected value of the asset 
  Q* Î{0, QAS, QAL, QBS, QBL}   
The first term captures the uninformed investors' desire for value. Value reflects their 
desire to transact at a price as close as possible to their expectation of the asset’s value. The pain 
from this non-positive term is minimized when uninformed investors choose quantities that are 
smaller and have prices closer to the uninformed expected value. This causes uninformed 
investors to be less likely to trade in the presence of an informed trader. In the second term, the 
uninformed investors' q reflects the intensity of their desire for satisfaction, 0 £ q £ ¥ . 
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Satisfaction reflects how strongly they care about attaining their Q*s. The pain from this non-
positive term is minimized when uninformed investors choose to trade quantities equal to their 
Q*s. The strength of the uninformeds’ desire for satisfaction, q, may be influenced by such 
factors as their access to substitute products and seasonal pressures. For example, an investor 
may have a stronger desire to trade a particular quantity to achieve a desired portfolio position 
near the end of a fiscal reporting period. The two shadow costs of value and satisfaction and their 
interaction are the key determinants of which quantities, if any, uninformed investors choose to 
trade in equilibrium. Heterogeneous uninformed investors are assumed to have a common 
intensity of desire for satisfaction (a common theta) but different exogenous demands for 
quantity (heterogeneous Q*s).   
2.2. Selected results 
 The key one-period results proved in HM concern the nature of equilibrium prices, the 
optimal behavior of liquidity demanders, and empirical predictions about the extent of trade at 
various quantities in asset markets. I briefly summarize only those results that are relevant to the 
empirical implication used in this paper.   
HM examine a rational expectations equilibrium. Equilibrium prices are optimally set to 
reflect the probabilistic presence of the uninformed investors and the informed trader, taking into 
account their relative presence in the population of liquidity demanders and their endogenous 
quantity choices given their Q*s and P*. If there is no possibility of an informed trader, all prices 
equal the asset’s uninformed expected value. If there are potentially both informed and 
uninformed traders, the informed trader’s presence pushes ask prices above and bid prices below 
the uninformed expected value.  
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The informed trader’s maximization is also very reminiscent of the earlier literature, such as Copeland and Galai 
(1983) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).   
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 In an equilibrium with an informed trader present, an uninformed investor never chooses 
to trade if her desire for satisfaction, theta, is zero or is low enough. The desire for satisfaction of 
a non-zero Q* is the only thing that can motivate an uninformed investor to trade in the face of 
her negative value term.  
 The informed trader never chooses to trade a quantity that the uninformed investors do 
not have a positive probability of trading. Furthermore, if the uninformed investors are trading 
some non-zero quantity, the informed trader never abstains from trading altogether.  
 These equilibrium behaviors lead to the following empirical implication. The number of 
quantities traded in a market with heterogeneous uninformed investors is increasing in the 
uninformed investors’ desire for satisfaction. At a low (or zero) desire for satisfaction, theta, the 
uninformed investors' satisfaction terms are not large enough to offset their value terms, so they 
choose not to trade, leading to a no-trade equilibrium. At a somewhat higher theta, the 
uninformed investors' satisfaction terms begin to offset their value terms, causing them to choose 
to trade but not all quantities. This leads to a one-quantity equilibrium. Finally, at a very high (or 
infinite) theta, the uninformed investors' satisfaction terms dominate their value terms, and they 
choose to trade exactly their Q*s. This results in a multiple-quantity equilibrium.   
Although HM model only two quantities on each side of the market, the intuition that 
more quantities are traded at higher desires for satisfaction extends naturally to a market with 
more than two possible quantities. In a richer setting with many possible quantities, the informed 
trader’s relative presence across different quantities continues to make some quantities worse 
value than other quantities for the uninformed investors. A higher desire for satisfaction is 
required to induce the uninformed investors to trade more of the possible quantities because the 
value-satisfaction trade-off varies across quantities. 
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3. Empirical specification and methodology 
The ends of fiscal quarters are natural times when the quantity dimension is likely to be 
more binding, as investors are likely to have a stronger desire to trade specific quantities. This 
could be due to quarter-end window dressing or simply a heightened desire to have portfolios 
fully aligned with their stated objectives at times when internal and external scrutiny may be 
greater. Hodrick and Moulton (2003) predict that in a market with many heterogeneous 
uninformed investors, an asset will trade at more distinct quantities when investors have a 
stronger desire to satisfy their exogenous demands. “At more distinct quantities” refers to trades 
of more different quantities (sizes) taking place, not necessarily more trades or more total 
volume. For example, five trades of different size blocks constitute five sizes, while two trades of 
one size and three trades of another size constitute two sizes. I use foreign-exchange transaction 
data to test whether the number of different quantities traded is significantly higher at quarter-
end than at other times.  
3.1. Basic specification    
In its simplest form, I test whether the number of sizes traded rises significantly at 
quarter-end, controlling for the number of trades because the number of distinct sizes is closely 
related to the number of trades: there cannot be more sizes than trades in a day. Taking this into 
account suggests the following basic specification: 
 Sizest = a + b1EOQt + b2Tradest + et                 (4) 
  where  Sizest = number of distinct quantities traded on day t 
   EOQt = 1 if day t is in end-of-quarter period, else 0 
   Tradest = total number trades on day t 
If quarter-ends do witness an increase in customers’ desire to trade specific quantities, the 
coefficient on the end-of-quarter indicator in Eq. (4) should be significantly positive.   
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3.2. Extended specification    
For robustness, I also consider an extended specification that includes the following 
additional explanatory variables that may affect size choices.  
Non-end-of-quarter Month-ends: I test whether non-end-of-quarter month-ends exhibit a 
significant increase in the number of quantities traded. If they do not, it will help to support the 
interpretation of customers' experiencing an increase in desire for satisfaction versus an 
alternative explanation that the increase in number of quantities traded is primarily due to 
monthly events such as index changes. Monthly index changes map more closely to changing 
exogenous demands, rather than customers’ increasing desire to satisfy their demands, and 
should affect all month-ends, not just quarter-ends.  
Price Level: Perhaps when an asset trades at a price level that is widely believed to be 
important, trading activity increases and size choices are affected. Recent work linking liquidity 
and technical analysis, Osler (2003) in the foreign-exchange market and Kavajecz and Odders-
White (2003) in equities, suggests that prices’ crossing major round numbers can bring about 
changes in trading activity.  
Implied Volatility: Customers’ size choices may be affected when the market is perceived 
to be more volatile, as reflected in short-dated implied volatility.   
9/11 Period: The 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks may provide insight into how extreme 
uncertainty affects size choices. Many banks’ operations were impeded on that day, so the four-
day period beginning on 9/11/2001 is examined.   
Futures Expiration: Size choices in an asset market may be affected by the changes in 
trading activity on the last trading day of a related futures contract, as documented by Brown and 
Steenbeek (2001).   
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Central Bank Interventions: I use foreign-exchange transactions in my empirical analysis, 
and in this market central bank interventions may affect size choices.  
Incorporating these explanatory variables leads to the following extended specification: 
 Sizest = a + b1EOQt + b2Tradest + b3NonEOQt + b4PriceLevelt + b5ImpVolt  
   + b6Period9/11t + b7FutExpt + b8CBIt + et           (5) 
  where  Non-EOQt = 1 if day t is in non-end-of-quarter month-end period,  
 else 0 
PriceLevelt = 1 if major price level is hit on day t, else 0 
ImpVolt = implied volatility on day t 
Period9/11t = 1 if day t is in 9/11 period, else 0 
FutExpt = 1 if day t is a futures expiration date, else 0 
CBIt = 1 if there is central bank intervention on day t, else 0 
If quarter-ends witness an increase in customers’ desire to trade specific quantities, the 
coefficient on the end-of-quarter indicator in Eq. (5) should be significantly positive. 
Furthermore, an insignificant coefficient on the non-end-of-quarter month-end indicator would 
suggest that it is not just monthly index-related increases in customers’ exogenous demands, but 
also their increasing desire to satisfy those exogenous demands at quarter-end, which lead to the 
increase in quantities traded.   
3.3. Econometric methodology 
 I estimate Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) separately for each currency using ordinary least squares 
regression. 5 In preliminary analysis both equations display evidence of autocorrelation, with 
Durbin-Watson statistics ranging from 1.2 to 1.9.  Preliminary analysis also reveals some 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Newey-West standard errors with five lags are employed to 
                                                 
5 As a robustness check, a seemingly unrelated regressions model was estimated for all currencies jointly and for 
two sub-groups, the three most active and the three less active currencies. Results are qualitatively similar and are 
available on request.    
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address these two issues.6    
4. Data 
I use spot foreign-exchange customer transaction data from a major foreign-exchange 
dealer bank in my empirical tests. This data set is well-suited to the analysis for several reasons.  
First, foreign exchange is traded by a highly heterogeneous set of customers, including 
corporates, equity investors, fixed income investors, mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge 
funds, making this a promising asset class for testing an empirical implication that involves 
investor heterogeneity. Second, the simplicity of foreign exchange minimizes some types of 
noise, such as might arise from changes in private information or financing terms. Third, foreign 
exchange is a very active market and this bank executes many transactions every day with a wide 
range of customer types.   
4.1. Transaction data 
The main data set consists of spot foreign-exchange transactions for six major currency 
pairs between one bank and its customers from January 2000 to December 2002. The bank is one 
of the top three foreign-exchange dealers globally and has a large and diverse customer base. 
Unlike in many other asset markets, customer-dealer trades in the foreign-exchange market are 
visible only to the customer and the bank involved in the transaction. Banks view their customer 
order flow as highly proprietary and are typically reluctant to make it publicly available. The 
only other foreign-exchange customer trade data used in the literature to date are qualitatively 
different from this data set. For example, Lyons (1995) uses transaction- level data on one week 
of U.S. dollar/Deutschemark trades, but his sample includes no customer trades. Yao’s (1997) 
transaction- level data from a bank include customer as well as interdealer trades, but his sample 
                                                 
6 Both the number of sizes and the number of trades per day show an upward trend over the period, but augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests strongly reject the hypothesis of a unit root. 
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is limited to one currency pair and a 25-day period in 1995. Fan and Lyons (2003) obtain a 
multi-year sample of customer transaction data for two currency pairs from a top-three foreign-
exchange dealer bank, but their data are aggregated on a daily basis so no transaction- level 
analysis is possible. Osler (2003) also uses foreign-exchange customer data from a bank, but her 
focus is orders rather than transactions.   
 The sample employed here includes spot foreign-exchange transactions for the six most 
actively traded currency pairs, referred to henceforth as the major currencies: the euro, Japanese 
yen, British pound, Australian dollar, Swiss franc, and Canadian dollar, all versus the U.S. dollar. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey (2002) 
on foreign-exchange activity, these six currency pairs account for 94% of all foreign-exchange 
trading. The original data set included about 1.5 million transactions, of which 3,714 transactions 
(about 0.25%) were dropped because of incomplete information. The total dollar volume of 
transactions in the final sample is about $9.7 trillion. Transactions are date-stamped but not time-
stamped and are not ordered sequentially, so it is not possible to determine in what order the 
transactions occurred within a day. This precludes an examination of intraday time periods, 
which would also be interesting.   
My empirical tests focus on the number of quantities traded each day in each currency 
pair. Because foreign-exchange rates vary intraday, it is not sufficient to identify all trades for 
the same U.S. dollar amount, for example, as being one size. Transactions are considered to be 
the same size if their traded amounts match on either side of the currency pair. For example, a 
day in which the following trades occurred would be summarized as having five trades, with 
three sizes traded.   
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Transaction 
Number USD Amount  EUR Amount   
1   $100  €102  
2   $49  € 50 
3   $100  € 101 (same USD size as Transaction #1) 
4   $48  € 50 (same EUR size as Transaction #2) 
5   $50  € 51 
Total: 5 trades, 3 sizes 
Customers’ fiscal quarter-ends are not observable in this data set, so I use calendar 
quarter-ends as a proxy for fiscal quarter-ends. Although customers from different countries have 
different fiscal year-ends (for example, March in Japan, June in Australia and New Zealand, 
December in the U.S. and Europe), the bank confirms that calendar quarter-ends coincide with 
fiscal quarter-ends for most customers in the data set. I used a separate data set from the same 
bank, consisting of customer transactions in three minor currencies (Swedish krona, New 
Zealand dollar, and Norwegian krone versus U.S. dollar), to choose the length of the end-of-
quarter period. The length of the end-of-quarter period may be crucial to this analysis; using a 
separate data set to select the period length minimizes model-selection and inadvertent data-
snooping biases in the formal analysis of the six major currencies. While the last day of the 
quarter is a reasonable window, my prior was that either the last week or the last two weeks of 
the quarter would be the most relevant window. For example, the financial press generally begins 
reporting Japanese year-end repatriation flows affecting asset markets around the middle of 
March; see, for example, Downey (2002).  Analysis of the minor currency data set showed that 
the strongest relation arises when the end-of-quarter period is defined as the last two weeks of 
the quarter, so a two-week end-of-quarter period is used in the analysis below.  
The main limitation of this transaction data set is that it reflects the trading activity of 
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only one bank, which may or may not be representative of the entire foreign-exchange market. 
The BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey (2002) on foreign-exchange activity provides some 
perspective on the representativeness of this bank’s transactions. The BIS (2002) reports that 
from five to 18 banks in each country account for 75% of the foreign-exchange trading activity. 
This bank would be included in that group in every major trading center. The breakdown of this 
bank’s trading activity among the six major currencies mirrors that of the market as a who le, as 
detailed in the BIS (2002) survey, suggesting that this bank is not an outlier at least in these 
readily observable dimensions.  
4.2. Market data 
The transaction data set described above is supplemented with market data from several 
sources. Implied volatilities for one-month at-the-money options on the underlying currencies are 
from the same bank. Daily open, high, low, and close exchange rates are from Bloomberg.  
Currency futures information is from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Central bank 
intervention dates are assembled from central bank websites and press reports, for example, 
Reuters (2003).  
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows that both the number of trades per day and the number of sizes traded per 
day in each currency varies widely within the period. Furthermore, although all six are major 
currencies, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in their activity levels. For example, 
the euro has about double the activity of the British pound in this sample, and the euro, Japanese 
yen, and British pound collectively account for about 80% of the sample in terms of total trades 
and total dollar volume.  
The price level indicator used in this analysis is motivated by the findings of Osler (2003) 
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that foreign-exchange price-contingent orders tend to cluster around prices ending in zeros. The 
price level indicator is set equal to one on days when the currency’s price hits or crosses a price 
ending in two zeros. For example, if the Japanese yen hits or crosses 119.00, its price level 
indicator is set to one on that day. Similarly, if the Australian dollar hits or crosses 0.5900, its 
price level indicator is set equal to one on that day. On average, about 80% of the daily 
observations in each currency have a price level indicator equal to one.   
5. Results 
This section first presents the results from estimating the basic regression equation to 
determine whether more sizes are traded at quarter-ends. It then presents several robustness 
checks. The section concludes with an examination of whether the more-binding quantity 
dimension at quarter-end is driven by changes in exogenous demands or changes in the desire for 
satisfaction.   
5.1. Results from the basic specification 
 Panel A of Table 2 displays the results from estimating Eq. (4), in which the number of 
sizes traded per day is regressed on the end-of-quarter indicator and the number of trades per 
day. The results indicate that more sizes tend to trade at the end of calendar quarters after 
controlling for the number of trades in a day. The coefficients on the end-of-quarter indicator are 
statistically significant, at the 1% level for the Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc, and 
Canadian dollar, the 5% level for the euro, and the 10% level for the Australian dollar. Even 
adjusting the test size for the six non-overlapping two-week periods in each quarter with a 
Bonferroni or Sidak adjustment, four of the six currencies’ coefficient estimates are significant at 
the 5% level or better. The coefficients on the end-of-quarter indicator are also economically 
significant. For example, there are about 14 more sizes traded per day in the British pound during 
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the end-of-quarter period, all else equal. For a sense of the economic significance, recall that 
over the entire sample the British pound traded an average of 213 sizes per day.   
5.2. Robustness checks  
To check the robustness of the results from the basic specification, I consider several 
alternative specifications. First, Eq. (5) provides some insight into how other factors influence 
size choices. To determine whether the observed size effect is due to quarter-end or due to the 
aggregation of year-end behavior of customers with different fiscal year-ends, I analyze subsets 
of trades for customers with different fiscal year-ends. Finally, I examine whether the results 
hold across customer-type sub-groups. The results are also robust to quadratic and log 
specifications; see Appendix for results.   
5.2.1. Extended specification 
Panel B of Table 2 displays the results from estimating Eq. (5), in which the number of 
sizes traded per day is regressed on a larger set of potential explanatory variables. Overall, the 
results from the basic specification are robust to the inclusion of these additional explanatory 
variables. The coefficients on the end-of-quarter indicator are little changed in both magnitude 
and significance, while several of the added explanatory variables shed more light on the 
motivations behind trading more versus fewer sizes.  
The non-end-of-quarter month-end indicator is insignificant in five of the six currencies, 
suggesting that the increase in number of sizes traded at quarter-end is not simply a reflection of 
monthly events such as index changes.   
The price level indicator is weakly significant in the euro and the Japanese yen, and in 
both cases it appears that when the currency crosses a major level fewer sizes are traded, all else 
equal. This fits well with the intuition of Osler (2003), who shows that foreign-exchange stop-
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loss and take-profit orders tend to cluster at round prices. If primarily technical traders place 
these orders, they are very likely to be for standard sizes and thus reduce the number of sizes 
traded, after controlling for the total number of trades. That this variable is significant for only 
the euro and the Japanese yen may be due to greater participation of technical traders in the two 
largest currencies than in the smaller currencies. Using two price level indicators, for prices 
ending in two and three zeros, in the extended regression yields qualitatively similar results, with 
larger coefficients on the three-zero price level indicator than on the two-zero price level 
indicator; results available on request.  
The four-day period beginning on 9/11 witnessed a significant decrease in the number of 
sizes traded in four of the six currencies. One possible explanation is that the extreme uncertainty 
brought about by the terrorist attacks caused customers to be less concerned with trading specific 
quantities and instead to focus on trading quickly. Furthermore, the composition of customers 
trading may have been different during this period, representing a change in the exogenous 
desires to trade as well. Such changes in customer composition are not statistically detectable 
among the broad customer categories identified by the bank, suggesting that changes, if any, 
occurred within customer categories. Implied volatility presents a more mixed picture, with 
higher volatility associated with more sizes traded in three currencies and fewer sizes traded in 
the AUD.  
Futures expiration dates have a significant impact on the number of sizes traded in only 
one of the six currencies. In the Australian dollar, futures expiration tends to be associated with 
fewer sizes traded in the spot market, perhaps suggesting a higher concentration of uniform size 
trades on those days to match contract round lots.  
Central bank intervention dates are insignificant at conventional levels in this sample. 
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There are two plausible explanations for the failure of central bank intervention to have a broader 
effect on size choices. First, there was very little central bank intervention in the currency 
markets during the January 2000 to December 2002 period. The Japanese yen witnessed the most 
intervention, 18 of the 22 occurrences. Second, the price level and volatility measures may 
capture most of the effect of central bank intervention on trading activity, as suggested by 
Dominguez (1998). Using two central bank intervention indicators, one for interventions 
involving both sides of a currency pair and the other when only one side is involved, yields 
qualitatively similar results; results available on request.  
5.2.2. Year-end analysis 
I motivated the empirical specification by suggesting that customers have a heightened 
desire to trade specific amounts at quarter-end. An alternative explanation is that these pressures 
arise primarily at fiscal year-end and appear to be a quarter-end effect because of the aggregation 
of trades from customers with different fiscal year-ends. For example, fiscal year-end is 
December for most U.S. and European customers, March for most Japanese customers, and June 
for most Australian customers. Customer domicile is an imperfect proxy for a customer’s fiscal 
year-end, but it is the best proxy available in this data set.   
Customer domicile information is available for about 75% of the trades in the transaction 
data set. This information is used to create three subsets, for customers with fiscal year-ends in 
December, March, and June. The December year-end subset is the largest, with about 68% of the 
transaction data set. The March and June year-end subsets are much smaller, and in each case 
only one currency, the Japanese yen for March fiscal year-end and the Australian dollar for June 
fiscal year-end, has enough trades to allow meaningful analysis. Other currencies have trades on 
too few days and too few trades per day. For example, less than 1% of all Canadian dollar trades 
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involve customers with March fiscal year-ends (customers domiciled in Japan). 
 Table 3 displays regression results for the fiscal year-end subsets. Panel A shows the 
results from estimating the basic specification, Eq. (4). These results are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained on the entire transaction data set: the coefficients on the quarter-end indicators are 
positive and significant for most currencies. Panel B displays the results from estimating a 
regression in which one indicator is used for the fiscal year-end and another is used for the other 
three quarter-ends. The results in Panel B suggest that the quarter-end effect is not simply a 
reflection of year-end effects aggregated across customers with different year-ends. The 
coefficients on non-year-end end-of-quarter indicators are positive and significant overall. The 
coefficients on the year-end indicators generally lack significance at conventional levels, 
probably because there are only three year-end periods in the sample.   
5.2.3. Customer-type analysis 
One of the attractions of using foreign-exchange data in this empirical study is that 
foreign-exchange customers are highly heterogeneous and therefore would be expected to have 
highly heterogeneous quantity demands. In this section I examine whether the quarter-end 
increase in the number of sizes traded is driven by one customer type, all customer types, or the 
aggregation across customer types.   
The bank classifies customer types using five codes, corresponding to corporate hedgers, 
mutual funds, commodity trading advisers (CTAs), hedge funds, and relative value traders. Other 
customer types, such as pension funds and proprietary traders, are classified into these five 
groups according to their trading styles. Customer codes are available for about 80% of the six-
currency sample.   
Table 4 displays the results from estimating Eq. (4) for each customer type individually. 
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The quarter-end effects generally appear strong in the mutual fund category, as expected given 
mutual funds’ focus on quarterly reporting and dividends. But there is evidence of a significant 
quarter-end effect in each of the five customer types, and no single type seems to be driving the 
quarter-end results of the combined sample. The distribution of customer types over time shows 
no significant change at quarter-end; results available on request.   
5.3. Exogenous demand v ersus desire for satisfaction  
The analysis above shows that more sizes are traded at the end of calendar quarters and 
that this result is robust to several alternative specifications, suggesting that the quantity 
dimension is more binding at quarter-ends. This section outlines evidence regarding whether the 
quantity dimension binds more because of an increase in the number of exogenous demands or 
because of an increase in customers’ desire to satisfy their exogenous demands, which I have 
proposed as a likely scenario at quarter-ends. One potential explanation, that the quarterly results 
are driven by monthly changes in exogenous demands such as index rebalancing, is refuted by 
the insignificant coefficient estimates on the non-end-of-quarter end-of-month indicator in Eq. 
(5); see Table 2. While this result and the following additional analyses cannot completely 
dismiss changes in exogenous demands as an explanation, the evidence is supportive of changes 
in the desire for satisfaction playing a key role.   
5.3.1. Trade and size distributions 
If an increase in the number of exogenous demands is driving the binding-quantity result, 
there should be an increase in the number of trades at quarter-end. Furthermore, a seasonal 
change in exogenous demands would likely lead to a noticeable change in the distribution of 
sizes traded.  
Table 5 displays the results of two-sided t-tests comparing trade and size characteristics 
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in quarter-end versus non-quarter-end periods for each of the six currencies. The average number 
of trades is not significantly higher at quarter-end, suggesting that it is not purely an increase in 
the number of exogenous demands or increased order-splitting that leads to an increase in the 
number of sizes traded.   
Table 5 also shows that there is no  systematic difference in the average size or 
interquartile range of sizes traded at quarter-end. This lack of systematic change in the 
distribution of sizes suggests that the increase in number of sizes traded may be a result of 
customers’ refining their size choices at quarter-end. It is possible that this refinement occurs in 
customers’ exogenous demands, but it is not obvious why exogenous demands would be finer at 
quarter-end, whereas quarter-end reporting may quite naturally cause customers to refine the 
quantities they choose to execute given the same exogenous demands.  
5.3.2. Round versus odd sizes 
This section examines whether the increase in sizes traded at quarter-end is caused by 
customers’ choosing to trade more round sizes, such as exact multiples of a million on one 
currency side, or more odd (non-round) sizes. In the foreign-exchange market round lots and odd 
lots are traded through the same mechanisms. 
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates for the basic regression specification in Eq. (4), but 
with round sizes and odd sizes considered separately as the dependent variable. For this analysis 
a round size is defined as one that is a multiple of one million on either currency side; all other 
sizes are odd. A robustness check defining round sizes by thousands yields qualitatively similar 
results; results available on request. In four of the six currencies there is no significant increase 
in the number of round sizes traded at quarter-end, while five of the six currencies show a 
significant increase in the number of odd sizes traded at quarter-end. This indicates that the 
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additional sizes traded at quarter-end are primarily odd sizes, not round sizes.   
Table 7 shows that in general there are significantly fewer round-size trades and more 
odd-size trades at quarter-end than during non-quarter-end periods. This suggests that customers 
switch from trading round lots to trading odd lots at quarter-end, since Table 5 shows no 
statistically significant difference in the total number of trades at quarter-end.   
There are several reasons that customers may generally favor round sizes over odd sizes. 
In examining price clustering in equity markets, Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (2001) suggest that 
people simply prefer round numbers. In the foreign-exchange market, Osler (2003) discusses the 
preference for round numbers in price-contingent order placement. Grossman et al. (1997) 
provide an explanation for round price clustering related to communication efficiency: the fewer 
digits specified, the less time it takes to communicate an order and the lower the chance of 
errors. This logic is as applicable to choosing quantities as it is to choosing prices. Mitchell 
(2001) suggests that the preference for round numbers could be related to cognitive efficiency, 
the ease with which shorter numbers are recalled and processed relative to longer numbers. Yule 
(1927) suggests a more fundamental attraction of round numbers. He finds that measurements 
taken by scientists in a wide range of disciplines cluster at round numbers. Yule (1927) also finds 
that greater precision can be induced, and rounding reduced, when the importance of the 
observational unit is stressed to those taking the measurements, a situation analogous to an 
increase in the desire for satisfaction considered here.   
The observed quarter-end decrease in the number of round-size trades and increase in the 
number and precision of odd-size trades are consistent with a scenario in which customers with 
heterogeneous demands generally prefer to trade round sizes but are motivated to trade more 
precise sizes at quarter-end, when their desire to satisfy their exogenous demands is higher.  
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5.3.3. Futures as substitutes 
In the Hodrick and Moulton (2003) model, investors’ desire for satisfaction of their 
exogenous demands for a particular asset should be affected by the availability and suitability of 
substitute assets. All else equal, the existence of substitutes should decrease the desire for 
satisfaction for a particular asset, since investors could choose to trade the substitute instead. Just 
as customers may have an increased desire to trade precise amounts at quarter-end, they may 
have an increased desire to trade a particular asset rather than a substitute at quarter-end. Both of 
these desires are encompassed by the desire for satisfaction in the Hodrick and Moulton (2003) 
model. The attractiveness of substitutes may also vary with relative pricing over time, but price 
discrepancies are rare in the foreign-exchange market and so are not explored here. In this 
section I examine how the trading activity in currency futures compares to that in the spot 
market, in order to explore the availability-of-substitutes aspect of the desire for satisfaction.   
I find a weak but consistent decline in futures volume at quarter-end across all six 
currency contracts,7 which dovetails with the weak increase in spot volume in Table 5. This 
pattern suggests that customers shift some trading activity from futures to the spot market at 
quarter-end. This shift may reflect a stronger desire to trade precise quantities rather than the 
fixed futures contract sizes. Another explanation is that futures are a less-satisfying substitute for 
spot foreign exchange at quarter-end. This could be due to futures’ embedded interest rate 
exposure, which is at a maximum in the last two weeks of every quarter when the front contract 
has just rolled to a three-month expiration.  
If futures and spot foreign exchange were perfect substitutes they should exhibit similar 
changes in the number of sizes traded over time. Pane l A of Table 8 presents the results from 
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regressing the number of futures sizes traded daily on an end-of-quarter indicator, controlling for 
the number of futures trades per day. 8 The only significant quarter-end effect appears in the 
British pound, which witnesses fewer sizes trading at quarter-end. The lack of a significant 
increase in futures sizes at quarter-end could be due to the standardized nature of futures, which 
makes them a less natural vehicle for the sort of precision trading that appears to drive the 
increase in spot sizes at quarter-end. Customers who care about precision, all the time or 
seasonally, may not view futures as a useful substitute, consistent with futures’ minimal share of 
the total currency market. Daily futures trading volume on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
averages $100 million to $1.5 billion across the six currencies in April 2001, amounting to only 
0.2% to 0.9% of average daily spot transaction volume for the same month, reported by the BIS 
(2002). For robustness, Panel B of Table 8 adds a control for the futures calendar roll period; the 
results are qualitatively unchanged.   
Overall, the evidence from futures, viewed as imperfect substitutes for spot foreign 
exchange, is consistent with an increase in the desire for satisfaction at quarter-end. While 
quarter-end changes in exogenous demands – for example, fewer different futures exogenous 
demands and more different spot exogenous demands, with no substitution – cannot be ruled out, 
such an explanation is not as intuitive.  
6. Price dimension effects 
A key reason that market participants may care about the quantity dimension is that when 
customers have a stronger desire to satisfy their quantity demands, prices may move more or 
trades may take longer to complete, according to the model of Hodrick and Moulton (2003). An 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Results are from regressing daily futures volume for the front two contracts on an end-of-quarter indicator, 
controlling for the increase in volume caused by the rolling of positions to the next contract month around futures 
expiration dates; results available on request. 
8 I thank Bob Whaley for advising me how to obtain the futures transaction data for this analysis.   
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alternative view is that rather than trading off among quantity, price, and time, customers suffer 
or benefit on all three dimensions simultaneously. For example, when trading is “easy” 
customers may trade exactly the quantity they desire, with little price impact, immediately, and 
when trading is “tough” they may sacrifice on quantity, suffer greater price impact, and spread 
their trades over time.9 These two models suggest different empirical predictions for quarter-end 
price impact. Under Hodrick and Moulton (2003), price impact should be greater when 
customers care more about trading precise quantities at quarter-end. Under the alternative 
scenario price impact should be smaller at quarter-end, as customers are trading more precise 
amounts because it is easier to trade in general. In this section I examine whether customers 
suffer more or less in price terms when more precise quantities are traded at quarter-end.10   
The price impact measure used here is based on the work of Evans and Lyons (2002) and 
Fan and Lyons (2003), who find that foreign-exchange price changes are positively related to 
foreign-exchange net order flow, defined as the net of buyer- initiated and seller-initiated 
orders.11 In this data set, all orders are customer- initiated and specify how much and which 
currencies are bought and sold, so foreign-exchange net order flow is directly observable, albeit 
for only one bank and its customers. I use the following measure of daily price impact: 
Price Impact  =  Percentage Price Change   = Percentage Price Change 
   Net Order Flow   Buy Orders – Sell Orders 
Net order flow is measured in U.S. dollars, not as simply the net number of transactions. 
A finding that the price impact is larger at quarter-end would suggest that when customers care 
more about trading precise quantities (that is, the quantity dimension is more binding in the 
                                                 
9 I thank the referee for suggesting this alternative model.   
10 It would also be interesting to examine whether customers spread their trades out more intraday, indicating that 
they sacrifice along the time dimension, or less, indicating that trading is easier, but the absence of intraday time 
stamps and customer identity in this data set precludes such an analysis.   
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Hodrick and Moulton (2003) model), they sacrifice more on the price dimension. Alternatively, 
if customers trade more precise quantities when trading is “easy”, price impact should be smaller 
at quarter-end.  
Table 9 displays the results of t-tests comparing price change, order flow, and price 
impact in quarter-end versus non-quarter-end periods for each currency. The first three columns 
show that price change, absolute price change, and net order flow are not systematically different 
at quarter-end. The fourth column shows that price impact is significantly larger at quarter-ends 
than during non-quarter-end periods for the Brit ish pound, Australian dollar, Swiss franc, and 
Canadian dollar. The euro exhibits a surprisingly negative price impact, most likely reflecting 
noise in the price impact measure from using only one bank’s customer transactions with prices 
that are set by the entire market. Discussions with the bank indicate that over the sample period 
the bank’s market share in the euro was likely lower than its market share in the other currencies, 
which may explain the higher noise level. For the euro and the Japanese yen the price impact 
increases at quarter-end have p-values of only 18% and 13%. This lower significance may reflect 
the two largest currencies’ superior ability to absorb more pressure in the time dimension, 
relative to the smaller currencies.  
Regression ana lysis confirms that price impact is generally greater at quarter-end and 
shows that this effect is not explained by other variables such as trading volume or those 
included in Eq. (5) (see Appendix for results). Overall, the price impact results suggest that when 
customers care more about trading precise quantities they suffer a greater price impact to trade, 
consistent with the Hodrick and Moulton (2003) model.  
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002) develop a similar measure of equity price impact and find a positive 
relation between order flow and price change in the equity market as well.     
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7. Conclusions and future work 
Using a unique data set of foreign-exchange customer transactions, I find that the number 
of sizes traded increases significantly at quarter-ends. This evidence suggests that the quantity 
dimension is more binding at quarter-end, perhaps because of a heightened desire to have 
portfolios fully aligned with their stated objectives at times of greater scrutiny. Insignificant 
changes in the number of trades, total volume, and distribution of trade sizes, together with 
trading patterns in currency futures, all suggest that it is customers’ increasing desire to satisfy 
their quantity demands, rather than a change in those exogenous demands or order-splitting, that 
drives the increase in quantities traded at quarter-end. At quarter-end customers trade more odd 
sizes and fewer round sizes. I also find that when customers care more about getting their desired 
quantity, they suffer a greater price impact to trade.   
This work highlights the need to consider all three dimensions, quantity, time, and price, 
in evaluating liquidity. The price impact results suggest that the extent to which the quantity 
dimension binds may explain some of the time-series and cross-sectional variations in common 
liquidity measures. Future work will examine how investors trade off all three dimensions by 
comparing orders to executions and explore the links between these trade-offs and common 
liquidity measures.  
This work also offers an explanation for the clustering of trade sizes. The existence of 
this effect across many customer types, not only those unique to the foreign-exchange market, 
suggests that it may occur in other asset markets as well. Although it is difficult to determine true 
trade size from most equity transaction data sets, Alexander and Peterson (2004) document trade-
size clustering in NYSE stocks and find that the clustering centers on multiples of a few round 
sizes. In the fixed income market, researchers have observed trade-size as well as price clustering 
  30  
in transaction data sets, but to my knowledge a formal analysis has yet to be undertaken. Future 
work will examine how trade-size clustering is manifested in these other markets and how it 
relates to price clustering. Many empirical questions remain, including whether trade-size 
clustering and price clustering are substitutes or complements.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Foreign-Exchange Transaction Data 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the bank’s customer transactions in the six major currency pairs, euro 
(EUR), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP), Australian dollar (AUD), Swiss franc (CHF), and Canadian dollar 
(CAD), all versus the U.S. dollar. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of trading days 
varies by currency because of national holidays. 
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 
Daily Trades  
Mean 702 500 340 161 159 83 
Std. Dev. 245 173 111 67 63 38 
25% 486 362 248 105 112 55 
75% 865 601 423 207 194 104 
Daily Sizes 
Mean 351 228 213 81 75 49 
Std. Dev. 107 65 65 27 30 20 
25% 277 184 173 62 56 36 
75% 407 266 246 96 87 57 
Daily Volume ($mn) 
Mean 5,030 3,594 1,910 781 910 412 
Std. Dev. 2,856 1,422 924 563 562 366 
25% 3,478 2,645 1,271 410 542 173 
75% 5,821 4,429 2,319 1,006 1,164 500 
Average Daily Trade Size ($mn) 
Mean 7.487 7.399 5.958 5.286 5.923 5.412 
Std. Dev. 3.865 2.551 3.125 4.348 3.408 5.946 
25% 5.383 5.635 3.872 2.721 3.753 2.383 
75% 8.733 8.651 7.226 6.384 7.079 6.211 
Sample Totals  
Days 769 761 770 772 768 771 
Trades 539,629 380,184 261,424 124,470 122,104 63,711 
Volume ($bn) 3,868 2,735 1,470 603 699 317 
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Table 2 
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Sizes: Basic and Extended Specifications  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equations for 
each of the six major currencies. Newey-West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Panel A:  Sizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t + et                 
Panel B:  Sizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t +  b3NonEOQt + b4PriceLevelt + b5ImpVolt + b6Period9/11t  
    + b7FutExp t + b8CBIt + et                              
Sizes t is the number of distinct quantities traded on day t. EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last 
two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. Trades t is the number of transactions on day t. NonEOQt is an indicator 
taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar month that is not the end of a calendar quarter, else 
0. PriceLevelt is an indicator taking the value 1 if the currency crossed a major price level on day t, else 0. ImpVolt 
is the implied volatility for one-month currency options on day t. Period9/11t is an indicator taking the value 1 if day 
t is in the period 9/11/01 to 9/14/01, else 0. FutExp t is an indicator taking the value 1 if the related futures contract 
expired on day t, else 0. CBIt is an indicator taking the value 1 if there was central bank intervention on day t, else 0.  
Period covered is January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency because of 
national holidays.   
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 






















































































































































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
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Table 3 
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Sizes: By Customer Year-End  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equations for each of the six major currencies. Newey-
West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Panel A: Sizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t + et                                   
Panel B: Sizes t = a + b1NonEOYEOQt + b2EOYt + b3Trades t + et                       
Sizes t is the number of distinct quantities traded on day t.  EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. 
Trades t is the number of transactions on day t. NonEOYEOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a fiscal quarter other than the 
fiscal year-end of interest, else 0. EOYt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of the fiscal year of interest, else 0. Period covered is 
January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency because of national holidays and customer activity. Only one currency is 
analyzed for March and June year-ends because trading in the other currencies by customers with those fiscal year-ends is minimal. 
Year-End Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Mar Jun 
Currency EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD JPY AUD 

















































Panel B: End-of-Quarter and End-of-Year 


































































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 746 768 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5% , c significant at 10% 
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Table 4  
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Sizes: Customer Types  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equation for 
each of the six major currencies by customer type. Newey-West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Sizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t + et                   
Sizes t is the number of distinct quantities traded on day t by the specified customer type. EOQt is an indicator taking 
the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. Tradest is the number of transactions on day 
t by the specified customer type. For brevity, constants are not reported in the table. Period covered is January 3, 
2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency because of national holidays.   
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 





























































































































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
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Table 5  
End-of-Quarter Changes in Sizes and Trades 
This table reports the results of two-sided t-tests (with unequal variances) on the means of size and trade measures 
during end-of-quarter (EOQ) and non-end-of-quarter (Non-EOQ) periods. EOQ refers to all days falling in the last 
two weeks of a calendar quarter; Non-EOQ refers to all days not falling in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter. 
Sizes is the number of distinct quantities traded per day. Trades is the number of trades per day. Volume is the total 
volume in USD per day. Average Size is the average trade size in USD per day. Size Interquartile Range is the 
difference between the 75th and the 25th percentile trade size in USD per day. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to 

























EUR       
EOQ Average 374 734 5,597 7,724 3,225 115 
Non-EOQ Average 347 696 4,931 7,445 3,171 654 
p-value .04 .21 .05 .49 .65  
JPY       
EOQ Average 239 507 3,750 7,693 4,385 112 
Non-EOQ Average 226 498 3,568 7,348 4,194 649 
p-value .05 .62 .27 .30 .33  
GBP       
EOQ Average 230 348 1,924 5,734 1,904 115 
Non-EOQ Average 210 338 1,907 5,997 2,071 655 
p-value .01 .41 .85 .33 .10  
AUD       
EOQ Average 85 167 868 5,809 2,946 116 
Non-EOQ Average 80 160 766 5,193 2,513 656 
p-value .09 .38 .16 .16 .08  
CHF       
EOQ Average 79 161 997 6,381 4,533 115 
Non-EOQ Average 74 159 895 5,842 3,828 653 
p-value .10 .67 .09 .15 .03  
CAD       
EOQ Average 51 85 414 4,883 2,530 116 
Non-EOQ Average 48 82 411 5,506 2,954 655 
p-value .12 .52 .95 .13 .02  
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Table 6 
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Sizes: Round versus Odd Sizes  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equations for 
each of the six major currencies. Newey-West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Panel A: RoundSizes t = a + b1 EOQt + b2Trades t + et                     
Panel B: OddSizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t + et                  
RoundSizes t is the number of distinct round quantities, defined as round millions in either currency of the currency 
pair, traded on day t. EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter, 
else 0. Trades t is the number of transactions on day t. OddSizes t is the number of distinct odd quantities, defined as 
non-round millions in both currencies of the currency pair, traded on day t. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to 
December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency because of national holidays.   
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 










































































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
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Table 7 
End-of-Quarter Changes in Round versus Odd Trades 
This table reports the results of one-sided t-tests (with unequal variances) on the means of the number of round 
trades and the number of odd trades during end-of-quarter (EOQ) and non-end-of-quarter (Non-EOQ) periods. EOQ 
refers to all days falling in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter; Non-EOQ refers to all days not falling in the last 
two weeks of a calendar quarter. Round Trades is the number of trades in round-quantity trades, defined as round 
millions on either side. Odd Trades is the number of non-round-quantity trades, defined as non-round millions on 
both sides. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency 
because of national holidays. 
 Round Trades Odd Trades Number of Observations 
EUR    
EOQ Average 169 564 115 
Non-EOQ Average 179 517 654 
p-value .09 .02  
JPY    
EOQ Average 145 362 112 
Non-EOQ Average 158 340 649 
p-value .01 .05  
GBP    
EOQ Average 37 310 115 
Non-EOQ Average 43 295 655 
p-value .00 .09  
AUD    
EOQ Average 34 133 116 
Non-EOQ Average 35 125 656 
p-value .14 .11  
CHF    
EOQ Average 32 129 115 
Non-EOQ Average 35 123 653 
p-value .08 .14  
CAD    
EOQ Average 10.6 74 116 
Non-EOQ Average 11.4 71 655 
p-value .10 .17  
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Table 8 
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Futures Sizes  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equations for 
each of the six major currencies. Newey-West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Panel A: FutSizes t = a + b1 EOQt + b2FutTrades t + et                    
Panel B: FutSizes t = a + b1 EOQt + b2FutRollt + b3FutTrades t + et                       
FutSizes t is the number of distinct futures quantities traded on day t.  EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t 
is in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. FutTrades t is the numb er of futures transactions on day t. 
FutRollt is an indicator taking the value of 1 if day t is in a two-week period ending on a futures expiration date, else 
0. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002.     
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 






















































































Number of Obs 757 757 757 757 757 757 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
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Table 9  
End-of-Quarter Changes in Price, Order Flow, and Price Impact 
This table reports the results of two-sided t-tests (with unequal variances) on the means of price changes and net 
order flow and one-sided t-tests (with unequal variances) on the means of price impact during end-of-quarter (EOQ) 
and non-end-of-quarter (Non-EOQ) periods. EOQ refers to all days falling in the last two weeks of a calendar 
quarter; Non-EOQ refers to all days not falling in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter. Price Change is the 
percentage price change in a day. Absolute Price Change is the absolute value percentage price change in a day. Net 
order flow is the net customer trade flow (buy orders – sell orders) in USD millions per day. Price Impact is the 
percentage price change (not absolute value) divided by net order flow per day. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to 
















EUR      
EOQ Average .00055 .00502 -21.249 -.00000 115 
Non-EOQ Average .00009 .00532 -33.029 -.00004 654 
p-value .49 .49 .88 .18  
JPY      
EOQ Average .00018 .00438 -36.388 .00013 112 
Non-EOQ Average .00015 .00481 -15.243 .00001 649 
p-value .96 .36 .44 .13  
GBP      
EOQ Average .00112 .00348 45.610 .00007 115 
Non-EOQ Average -.00014 .00384 -16.895 -.00002 655 
p-value .01 .27 .03 .02  
AUD      
EOQ Average -.00091 .00570 1.966 .00080 116 
Non-EOQ Average -.00002 .00542 -17.392 .00004 656 
p-value .24 .59 .11 .09  
CHF      
EOQ Average -.00010 .00565 2.184 .00065 115 
Non-EOQ Average -.00006 .00530 -6.822 .00006 653 
p-value .21 .44 .35 .00  
CAD      
EOQ Average .00021 .00258 13.367 .00022 116 
Non-EOQ Average .00008 .00277 3.447 .00002 655 
p-value .69 .33 .46 .01  
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Appendix 
A.1. Non-linear specifications 
Table A1 displays the results from estimating two alternative specifications that consider 
non- linear relations between the number of sizes and number of trades in a day.   
Panel A of Table A1 depicts a quadratic specification: 
Sizest = a + b1EOQt + b2Tradest + b3TradesSqt + et               (6) 
 where TradesSqt = total number of trades on day t, squared  
 The coefficient estimates on the quarter-end indicator in Eq. (6) are similar in magnitude 
and significance to those obtained in the basic specification, displayed in Table 2. Although the 
squared trades term is statistically significant in five of the six currencies, it is not economically 
significant, with coefficient estimates very close to zero.   
Panel B of Table A1 depicts the results from a log specification:    
log(Sizest) = a + b1EOQt + b2log(Tradest) + et            (7) 
where  log(Sizest) = natural logarithm of number of sizes traded on day t 
log(Tradest) = natural logarithm of total number of trades on day t 
The coefficient estimates on the end-of-quarter indicator in Eq. (7) are positive and 
statistically significant. Overall, the results from estimating the effects of quarter-end on the 
number of sizes traded appear robust to non- linear specifications.   
A.2. Price impact regression analysis 
Table A2 examines the effect of quarter-end on price impact in a regression framework. 
In Panel A price impact is regressed on the quarter-end indicator and daily transaction volume: 
 PriceImpt = a + b1EOQt + b2Volumet + et             (8) 
  where  PriceImpt = price impact on day t 
   EOQt = 1 if day t is in end-of-quarter period, else 0 
   Volumet = transaction volume in USD billions on day t 
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Daily transaction volume is included because prices may react to a given net order flow 
differently when it occurs on a high-volume versus a low-volume day. Quarter-end has a 
significantly positive effect on price impact for five of the six currencies. These results are robust 
to omission of the volume variable and replacement of volume with the number of trades; results 
available on request.   
Panel B of Table A2 expands the analysis to include the additional explanatory variables 
from the extended specification of the size regression, Eq. (5), to see if some of the price impact 
effect can be traced directly to other factors driving the size results:  
 PriceImpt = a + b1EOQt + b2Volumet + b3NonEOQt + b4PriceLevelt + b5ImpVolt  
   + b6Period9/11t + b7FutExpt + b8CBIt + et           (9)                 
The significantly negative coefficient estimate on futures expiration in three currencies 
suggests that large net flows on futures expiration days move prices less than on other days, 
perhaps because they are viewed as less informative. Coefficients on the remaining additional 
explanatory variables are generally insignificant, while the quarter-end coefficients are little 
changed.   
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Table A1 
End-of-Quarter Impact on Number of Sizes: Non-Linear Specifications  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics in parentheses, of the following regression equations for 
each of the six major currencies. Newey-West standard errors are computed using five lags. 
Panel A: Sizes t = a + b1EOQt + b2Trades t + b3TradesSq t + et                                 
Panel B: log(Sizes t) = a + b1EOQt + b2log(Trades t) + et                                  
Sizes t is the number of distinct quantities traded on day t.  EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the 
last two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. Trades t is the number of transactions on day t. TradesSqt is the squared 
number of transactions on day t. Log(Sizes t) is the natural logarithm of the number of distinct quantities traded on 
day t. Log(Trades t) is the natural logarithm of the number of transactions on day t. Period covered is January 3, 2000 
to December 31, 2002. Number of observations varies by currency because of national holidays.   
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 

















































Panel B: Logged 




































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
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Table A2  
End-of-Quarter Impact on Price Impact: Basic and Extended Specifications  
This table reports the coefficient estimates, with t-statistics using robust standard errors in parentheses, of the 
following regression equation for each of the six major currencies.   
Panel A:  PriceImp t = a + b1 EOQt + b2 Volumet + et       
Panel B:  PriceImp t = a + b1 EOQt + b2 Volumet +  b3NonEOQt + b4PriceLevelt + b5ImpVolt  
   + b6Period9/11t + b7FutExp t + b8CBIt + et                        
PriceImp t is the percentage price change divided by net order flow on day t. EOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 
if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar quarter, else 0. Volume t is the transaction volume in USD billions on 
day t. NonEOQt is an indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the last two weeks of a calendar month that is not the 
end of a calendar quarter, else 0. PriceLevelt is an indicator taking the value 1 if the currency crossed a major price 
level on day t, else 0. ImpVolt is the implied volatility for one-month currency options on day t. Period9/11t is an 
indicator taking the value 1 if day t is in the period 9/11/01 to 9/14/01, else 0. FutExp t is an indicator taking the 
value 1 if the related futures contract expired on day t, else 0. CBIt is an indicator taking the value 1 if there was 
central bank intervention on day t, else 0. Period covered is January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2002. Number of 
observations varies by currency because of national holidays.   
 EUR JPY GBP AUD CHF CAD 






















































































































































Number of Obs 769 761 770 772 768 771 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% 
